To be well-behaved, systems that process preference data must satisfy certain conditions identified by economic decision theory and by social choice theory. In ML, preferences and rankings are commonly learned by fitting a probabilistic model to noisy preference data. The behavior of this learning process from the view of economic theory has previously been studied for the case where the data consists of rankings. In practice, it is more common to have only pairwise comparison data, and the formal properties of the associated learning problem are more challenging to analyze. We show that a large class of random utility models (including the Thurstone-Mosteller Model), when estimated using the MLE, satisfy a Pareto efficiency condition. These models also satisfy a strong monotonicity property, which implies that the learning process is responsive to input data. On the other hand, we show that these models fail certain other consistency conditions from social choice theory, and in particular do not always follow the majority opinion. Our results inform existing and future applications of random utility models for societal decision making.

Conventional preference learning methods often prioritize opinions held more widely when aggregating preferences from multiple evaluators. This may result in policies that are biased in favor of some types of opinions or groups and susceptible to strategic manipulation. To address this issue, we develop a novel preference learning framework capable of aligning aggregate opinions and policies proportionally with the true population distribution of evaluator preferences. Grounded in social choice theory, our approach infers the feasible set of evaluator population distributions directly from pairwise comparison data. Using these estimates, the algorithm constructs a policy that satisfies foundational axioms from social choice theory, namely monotonicity and Pareto efficiency, as well as our newly-introduced axioms of population-proportional alignment and population-bounded manipulability. Moreover, we propose a soft-max relaxation method that smoothly trade-offs population-proportional alignment with the selection of the Condorcet winner (which beats all other options in pairwise comparisons). Finally, we validate the effectiveness and scalability of our approach through experiments on both tabular recommendation tasks and large language model alignment.

Despite its empirical success, Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has been shown to violate almost all the fundamental axioms in social choice theory -- such as majority consistency, pairwise majority consistency, and Condorcet consistency. This raises a foundational question: why does RLHF perform so well in practice if it fails these seemingly essential properties? In this paper, we resolve this paradox by showing that under mild and empirically plausible assumptions on the preference profile, RLHF does satisfy pairwise majority and Condorcet consistency. These assumptions are frequently satisfied in real-world alignment tasks, offering a theoretical explanation for RLHF's strong practical performance. Furthermore, we show that a slight modification to the reward modeling objective can ensure pairwise majority or Condorcet consistency even under general preference profiles, thereby improving the alignment process. Finally, we go beyond classical axioms in economic and social choice theory and introduce new alignment criteria -- preference matching, preference equivalence, and group preference matching -- that better reflect the goal of learning distributions over responses. We show that while RLHF satisfies the first two properties, it fails to satisfy the third. We conclude by discussing how future alignment methods may be designed to satisfy all three.

To be well-behaved, systems that process preference data must satisfy certain conditions identified by economic decision theory and by social choice theory. In ML, preferences and rankings are commonly learned by fitting a probabilistic model to noisy preference data. The behavior of this learning process from the view of economic theory has previously been studied for the case where the data consists of rankings. In practice, it is more common to have only pairwise comparison data, and the formal properties of the associated learning problem are more challenging to analyze. We show that a large class of random utility models (including the Thurstone–Mosteller Model), when estimated using the MLE, satisfy a Pareto efficiency condition.

AI alignment, the challenge of ensuring AI systems act in accordance with human values, has emerged as a critical problem in the development of systems such as foundation models and recommender systems. Still, the current dominant approach, reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) faces known theoretical limitations in aggregating diverse human preferences. Social choice theory provides a framework to aggregate preferences, but was not developed for the multidimensional applications typical of AI. Leveraging insights from a recently published urn process, this work introduces a preference aggregation strategy that adapts to the user's context and that inherits the good properties of the maximal lottery, a Condorcet-consistent solution concept.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), the standard for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values, is known to fail to satisfy properties that are intuitively desirable, such as respecting the preferences of the majority \cite{ge2024axioms}. To overcome these issues, we propose the use of a probabilistic Social Choice rule called \emph{maximal lotteries} as a replacement for RLHF. We show that a family of alignment techniques, namely Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) \cite{munos2023nash} and variants, approximate maximal lottery outcomes and thus inherit its beneficial properties. We confirm experimentally that our proposed methodology handles situations that arise when working with preferences more robustly than standard RLHF, including supporting the preferences of the majority, providing principled ways of handling non-transitivities in the preference data, and robustness to irrelevant alternatives. This results in systems that better incorporate human values and respect human intentions.

Social choice theory is the study of preference aggregation across a population, used both in mechanism design for human agents and in the democratic alignment of language models. In this study, we propose the representative social choice framework for the modeling of democratic representation in collective decisions, where the number of issues and individuals are too large for mechanisms to consider all preferences directly. These scenarios are widespread in real-world decision-making processes, such as jury trials, indirect elections, legislation processes, corporate governance, and, more recently, language model alignment. In representative social choice, the population is represented by a finite sample of individual-issue pairs based on which social choice decisions are made. We show that many of the deepest questions in representative social choice can be naturally formulated as statistical learning problems, and prove the generalization properties of social choice mechanisms using the theory of machine learning. We further formulate axioms for representative social choice, and prove Arrow-like impossibility theorems with new combinatorial tools of analysis. Our framework introduces the representative approach to social choice, opening up research directions at the intersection of social choice, learning theory, and AI alignment.

To be well-behaved, systems that process preference data must satisfy certain conditions identified by economic decision theory and by social choice theory. In ML, preferences and rankings are commonly learned by fitting a probabilistic model to noisy preference data. The behavior of this learning process from the view of economic theory has previously been studied for the case where the data consists of rankings. In practice, it is more common to have only pairwise comparison data, and the formal properties of the associated learning problem are more challenging to analyze. We show that a large class of random utility models (including the Thurstone–Mosteller Model), when estimated using the MLE, satisfy a Pareto efficiency condition.

In various decision making settings, from recommendation systems to hiring processes, often a sequence of decisions are made by a group. A naive approach to decision-making in such scenarios is to select the alternative with the highest supporters in each round. However, this method can lead to unrepresentative outcomes, where a majority dictates all decisions, potentially disincentivizing participation from minority groups. Consider the following example where a group of friends (voters) want to hang out together weekly. They have diverse choices for the activities (alternatives) they approve of every week (round), but only one activity can be chosen as the decision (i.e., the activity which the whole group ends up pursuing even if some don't like it).